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Abstract 
 
The Basel II Accord requires that banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking 
Institutions (ADIs) communicate their daily risk forecasts to the appropriate monetary 
authorities at the beginning of each trading day, using one or more risk models to 
measure Value-at-Risk (VaR). The risk estimates of these models are used to determine 
capital requirements and associated capital costs of ADIs, depending in part on the 
number of previous violations, whereby realised losses exceed the estimated VaR. In 
this paper we define risk management in terms of choosing sensibly from a variety of 
risk models, discuss the selection of optimal risk models, consider combining 
alternative risk models, discuss the choice between a conservative and aggressive risk 
management strategy, and evaluate the effects of the Basel II Accord on risk 
management. We also examine how risk management strategies performed during the 
2008-09 financial crisis, evaluate how the financial crisis affected risk management 
practices, forecasting VaR and daily capital charges, and discuss alternative policy 
recommendations, especially in light of the financial crisis. These issues are illustrated 
using Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, with an emphasis on how risk management 
practices were monitored and encouraged by the Basel II Accord regulations during the 
financial crisis. 
 
 
Key words and phrases: Value-at-Risk (VaR), daily capital charges, exogenous and 
endogenous violations, violation penalties, optimizing strategy, risk forecasts, 
aggressive or conservative risk management strategies, Basel II Accord, financial crisis. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22. 
 3
1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2008-09 has left an indelible mark on economic and financial 
structures worldwide, and left an entire generation of investors wondering how things 
could have become so severe. There have been many questions asked about whether 
appropriate regulations were in place, especially in the USA, to permit the appropriate 
monitoring and encouragement of (possibly excessive) risk taking.  
 
The Basel II Accord was designed to monitor and encourage sensible risk taking using 
appropriate models of risk to calculate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and subsequent daily 
capital charges. VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential 
loss to be expected over a given period, and is now a standard tool in risk management. 
It has become especially important following the 1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, 
whereby banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted 
(and encouraged) to use internal models to forecast daily VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a 
detailed discussion). The last decade has witnessed a growing academic and 
professional literature comparing alternative modelling approaches to determine how to 
measure VaR, especially for large portfolios of financial assets.  
 
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward 
institutions with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby 
actual returns are compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to 
assess the quality of the internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models 
lead to a greater number of violations than could reasonably be expected, given the 
confidence level, the ADI is required to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 for 
the penalties imposed under the Basel II Accord). Penalties imposed on ADIs affect 
profitability directly through higher capital charges, and indirectly through the 
imposition of a more stringent external model to forecast VaR. This is one reason why 
financial managers may prefer risk management strategies that are passive and 
conservative rather than active and aggressive.  
 
Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as 
higher capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, ADIs should perhaps 
consider a strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how many times ADIs 
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should violate in any financial year (for further details, see McAleer and da Veiga 
(2008a, 2008b), McAleer (2008), Caporin and McAleer (2009b) and McAleer et al. 
(2009)). This paper suggests alternative aggressive and conservative risk management 
strategies that can be compared with the use of one or more models of risk throughout 
the estimation and forecasting periods. 
 
This paper defines risk management in terms of choosing sensibly from a variety of risk 
models, discusses the selection of optimal risk models, considers combining alternative 
risk models, discusses the choice between conservative and aggressive risk management 
strategies, evaluates the effects of the Basel II Accord on risk management, examines 
how risk management strategies performed during the 2008-09 financial crisis, 
evaluates how the financial crisis affected risk management practices, forecasts VaR 
and daily capital charges, and discusses alternative policy recommendations, especially 
in light of the financial crisis.  
 
These issues are illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, with an emphasis on 
how risk management practices were monitored and encouraged by the Basel II Accord 
regulations during the financial crisis.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the main ideas of the 
Basel II Accord Amendment as it relates to forecasting VaR and daily capital charges. 
Section 3 reviews some of the most well known models of volatility that are used to 
forecast VaR and calculate daily capital charges, and presents aggressive and 
conservative bounds on risk management strategies. In Section 4 the data used for 
estimation and forecasting are presented. Section 5 analyses the forecast values of VaR 
and daily capital charges before and during the 2008-08 financial crisis, and Section 6 
summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
2. Forecasting Value-at-Risk and Daily Capital Charges   
  
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges (DCC) must be set at the higher 
of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied 
by a factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation involves the actual negative 
returns exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a given day: 
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 ( ){ }______60 1sup 3 VaR ,   VaRt tDCC k −= − + −  (1) 
 
where  
 
DCC = daily capital charges, which is the higher of ( ) 160______ VaR  and VaR3 −−+− tk , 
 
tVAR  = Value-at-Risk for day t, 
 
tttt zYVAR σˆˆ ⋅−= , 
 
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days, 
 
tYˆ = estimated return at time t, 
 
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,  
 
tσˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t, 
 
10 ≤≤ k   is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 1). 
 
 
[Table 1 goes here] 
 
 
The multiplication factor (or penalty), k, depends on the central authority’s assessment 
of the ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple back test. It is 
determined by the number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)). The minimum multiplication factor 
of 3 is intended to compensate for various errors that can arise in model 
implementation, such as simplifying assumptions, analytical approximations, small 
sample biases and numerical errors that tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the 
model (see Stahl (1997)). Increases in the multiplication factor are designed to increase 
the confidence level that is implied by the observed number of violations to the 99 per 
cent confidence level, as required by the regulators (for a detailed discussion of VaR, as 
well as exogenous and endogenous violations, see McAleer (2008), Jiménez-Martin et 
al. (2009), and McAleer et al. (2009)). 
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In calculating the number of violations, ADIs are required to compare the forecasts of 
VaR with realised profit and loss figures for the previous 250 trading days. In 1995, the 
1988 Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988) was amended to 
allow ADIs to use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1995)). However, ADIs that proposed using internal models 
are required to demonstrate that their models are sound. Movement from the green zone 
to the red zone arises through an excessive number of violations. Although this will lead 
to a higher value of k, and hence a higher penalty, a violation will also tend to be 
associated with lower daily capital charges. 
 
Value-at-Risk refers to the lower bound of a confidence interval for a (conditional) 
mean, that is, a “worst case scenario on a typical day”. If interest lies in modelling the 
random variable,  Yt , it could be decomposed as follows: 
 
 1( | )t t t tY E Y F ε−= + . (2) 
 
This decomposition states that Yt  comprises a predictable component,  E(Yt | Ft−1) , 
which is the conditional mean, and a random component, εt . The variability of  Yt , and 
hence its distribution, is determined by the variability of εt . If it is assumed that εt  
follows a distribution such that: 
 
),(~ 2ttt D σμε                                                       (3) 
 
where  μt  and  σ t  are the unconditional mean and standard deviation of  εt , respectively, 
these can be estimated using a variety of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric 
methods. The VaR threshold for  Yt  can be calculated as: 
 
 1( | )t t t tVaR E Y F ασ−= − , (3) 
 
where α  is the critical value from the distribution of εt  to obtain the appropriate 
confidence level. It is possible for σ t  to be replaced by alternative estimates of the 
conditional variance in order to obtain an appropriate VaR (for useful reviews of 
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theoretical results for conditional volatility models, see Li et al. (2002) and McAleer 
(2005),who discusses a variety of univariate and multivariate, conditional, stochastic 
and realized. volatility models).  
 
Some recent empirical studies (see, for example, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001) and 
Gizycki and Hereford (1998)) have indicated that some financial institutions 
overestimate their market risks in disclosures to the appropriate regulatory authorities, 
which can imply a costly restriction to the banks trading activity. ADIs may prefer to 
report high VaR numbers to avoid the possibility of regulatory intrusion. This 
conservative risk reporting suggests that efficiency gains may be feasible. In particular, 
as ADIs have effective tools for the measurement of market risk, while satisfying the 
qualitative requirements, ADIs could conceivably reduce daily capital charges by 
implementing a context-dependent market risk disclosure policy. For a discussion of 
alternative approaches to optimize VaR and daily capital charges, see McAleer (2008) 
and McAleer et al. (2009). 
 
The next section describes several volatility models that are widely used to forecast the 
1-day ahead conditional variances and VaR thresholds.  
 
3. Models for Forecasting VaR 
 
As discussed previously, ADIs can use internal models to determine their VaR 
thresholds. There are alternative time series models for estimating conditional volatility. 
In what follows, we present several conditional volatility models to evaluate strategic 
market risk disclosure, namely GARCH, GJR and EGARCH, with both normal and t 
distribution errors, where the degrees of freedom are estimated. For an extensive 
discussion of the theoretical properties of several of these models, see Ling and 
McAleer (2002a, 2002b, 2003a) and Caporin and McAleer (2009b). As an alternative to 
estimating the parameters, we also consider the exponential weighted moving average 
(EWMA) method by RiskmetricsTM (1996) that calibrates the unknown parameters. 
Apart from EWMA, the models are presented in increasing order of complexity.  
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3.1 GARCH 
 
For a wide range of financial data series, time-varying conditional variances can be 
explained empirically through the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model, which was proposed by Engle (1982). When the time-varying 
conditional variance has both autoregressive and moving average components, this 
leads to the generalized ARCH(p,q), or GARCH(p,q), model of Bollerslev (1986). It is 
very common to impose the widely estimated GARCH(1,1) specification in advance.  
 
Consider the stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for daily returns, ty :   
 
 t 1 2 t-1 t 2y = φ +φ y +ε , φ < 1  (4) 
 
for nt ,...,1= , where the shocks to returns are given by:  
 
 t t t t
2
t t -1 t-1
ε = η h , η ~ iid(0,1)
h = ω+αε + βh ,
 (5) 
 
and 0, 0, 0ω α β> ≥ ≥  are sufficient conditions to ensure that the conditional variance 
0>th . The stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model can be modified to incorporate a non-
stationary ARMA(p,q) conditional mean and a stationary GARCH(r,s) conditional 
variance, as in Ling and McAleer (2003b). 
 
3.2 GJR 
 
In the symmetric GARCH model, the effects of positive shocks (or upward movements 
in daily returns) on the conditional variance, th , are assumed to be the same as the 
negative shocks (or downward movements in daily returns). In order to accommodate 
asymmetric behaviour, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1992) proposed a model 
(hereafter GJR), for which GJR(1,1) is defined as follows:  
 
 2t t-1 t -1 t-1h = ω+(α+ γI(η ))ε + βh ,  (6) 
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where 0,0,0,0 ≥≥+≥> βγααω  are sufficient conditions for ,0>th  and )( tI η  is an 
indicator variable defined by: 
 
 ( ) 1, 0
0, 0
t
t
t
I
εη ε
<⎧= ⎨ ≥⎩  (7) 
 
 as tη  has the same sign as tε . The indicator variable differentiates between positive 
and negative shocks, so that asymmetric effects in the data are captured by the 
coefficient γ . For financial data, it is expected that 0≥γ  because negative shocks 
have a greater impact on risk than do positive shocks of similar magnitude. The 
asymmetric effect, ,γ  measures the contribution of shocks to both short run persistence, 
2α γ+ , and to long run persistence, 2α β γ+ + . Although GJR permits asymmetric 
effects of positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude on conditional volatility, the 
special case of leverage, whereby negative shocks increase volatility while positive 
shocks decrease volatility (see Black (1976) for an argument using the debt/equity 
ratio), cannot be accommodated. 
 
3.3 EGARCH 
 
An alternative model to capture asymmetric behaviour in the conditional variance is the 
Exponential GARCH, or EGARCH(1,1), model of Nelson (1991), namely:  
 
 t -1 t-1t t-1
t-1 t-1
ε εlogh = ω+α + γ + βlogh , | β |< 1
h h
 (8) 
 
where the parameters α , β  and γ  have different interpretations from those in the 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1, 1) models.  
 
EGARCH captures asymmetries differently from GJR. The parameters α  and γ  in 
EGARCH(1,1) represent the magnitude (or size) and sign effects of the standardized 
residuals, respectively, on the conditional variance, whereas α  and γα +  represent the 
effects of positive and negative shocks, respectively, on the conditional variance in 
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GJR(1,1). Unlike GJR, EGARCH can accommodate leverage, depending on restrictions 
imposed on the size and sign parameters. 
 
As noted in McAleer et al. (2007), there are some important differences between 
EGARCH and the previous two models, as follows: (i) EGARCH is a model of the 
logarithm of the conditional variance, which implies that no restrictions on the 
parameters are required to ensure 0>th ; (ii) moment conditions are required for the 
GARCH and GJR models as they are dependent on lagged unconditional shocks, 
whereas EGARCH does not require moment conditions to be established as it depends 
on lagged conditional shocks (or standardized residuals); (iii) Shephard (1996) observed 
that 1|| <β  is likely to be a sufficient condition for consistency of QMLE for 
EGARCH(1,1); (iv) as the standardized residuals appear in equation (7), 1|| <β  would 
seem to be a sufficient condition for the existence of moments; and (v) in addition to 
being a sufficient condition for consistency, 1|| <β  is also likely to be sufficient for 
asymptotic normality of the QMLE of EGARCH(1,1).  
 
3.4 Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
 
The three conditional volatility models given above are estimated under the following 
distributional assumptions on the conditional shocks: (1) normal, and (2) t, with 
estimated degrees of freedom. As an alternative to estimating the parameters of the 
appropriate conditional volatility models, RiskmetricsTM (1996) developed a model 
which estimates the conditional variances and covariances based on the exponentially 
weighted moving average (EWMA) method, which is, in effect, a restricted version of 
the ARCH(∞ ) model. This approach forecasts the conditional variance at time t as a 
linear combination of the lagged conditional variance and the squared unconditional 
shock at time 1t − . The EWMA model calibrates the conditional variance as: 
 
 2t t-1 t-1h = λh +(1- λ)ε  (9) 
 
where λ  is a decay parameter. Riskmetrics™ (1996) suggests that λ  should be set at 
0.94 for purposes of analysing daily data. As no parameters are estimated, there is no 
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need to establish any moment or log-moment conditions for purposes of demonstrating 
the statistical properties of the estimators. 
 
4. Data  
 
The data used for estimation and forecasting are the closing daily prices for Standard 
and Poor’s Composite 500 Index (S&P500), which were obtained from the Ecowin 
Financial Database for the period 3 January 2000 to 12 February 2009.  
 
If tP  denotes the market price, the returns at time t ( )tR  are defined as: 
 ( )1log / −=t t tR P P . (10) 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the S&P500 returns, for which the descriptive statistics are given in 
Table 2. The extremely high positive and negative returns are evident from September 
2008 onward, and have continued well into 2009. The mean is close to zero, and the 
range is between -11% and -9.5%. The Jarque-Bera Lagrange multiplier test for 
normality rejects the null hypothesis of normally distributed returns. As the series 
displays high kurtosis, this would seem to indicate the existence of extreme 
observations, as can be seen in the histogram, which is not surprising for financial 
returns data. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Several measures of volatility are available in the literature. In order to gain some 
intuition, we adopt the measure proposed in Franses and van Dijk (1999), where the true 
volatility of returns is defined as: 
 
 ( )( )21| −= −t t t tV R E R F , (11) 
 
where 1−tF  is the information set at time t-1.  
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Figure 2 shows the S&P500 volatility, as defined in equation (11). The series exhibit 
clustering that needs to be captured by an appropriate time series model. The volatility 
of the series appears to be high during the early 2000s, followed by a quiet period from 
2003 to the beginning of 2007. Volatility increases dramatically after August 2008, due 
in large part to the worsening global credit environment. This increase in volatility is 
even higher in October 2008. In less than 4 weeks in October 2008, the S&P500 index 
plummeted by 27.1%. In less than 3 weeks in November 2008, starting the morning 
after the US elections, the S&P500 index plunged a further 25.2%. Overall, from late 
August 2008, US stocks fell by an almost unbelievable 42.2% to reach a low on 20 
November 2008.  
 
An examination of daily movements in the S&P500 index back to 2000 suggests that 
large changes by historical standards are 4% in either direction. From January 2000 to 
March 2008, there was a 0.4% chance of observing an increase of 4% or more in one 
day, and a 0.2% chance of seeing a reduction of 4% or more in one day. Therefore, 
99.4% of movements in the S&P500 index during this period had daily swings of less 
than 4%. Prior to September 2008, the S&P500 index had only 24 days with massive 
4% gains, but since September 2008, there have been 12 more such days. On the 
downside, before the current stock market meltdown, the S&P500 index had only 18 
days with huge 4% or more losses, whereas during the recent panic, there were a further 
15 such days.  
 
This comparison is between more than 58 years and just six months. During this short 
time span of financial panic, the 4% or more gain days increased by 72%, while the 
number of 4% or more loss days increased by 106%. Such movements in the S&P500 
index are unprecedented. 
 
Alternative models of volatility can be compared on the basis of statistical significance, 
goodness of fit, forecasting VaR, calculation of daily capital charges, and optimality on 
a daily or temporally aggregated basis. As the focus of forecasting VaR is to calculate 
daily capital charges, subject to appropriate penalties, the most severe of which is 
temporary or permanent suspension from investment activities, the goodness of fit 
criterion used is the calculation of daily and mean capital charges, both before and after 
the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
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5. Forecasting VaR and Calculating Daily Capital Charges 
 
In this section, the forecast values of VaR and daily capital charges are analysed before 
and during the 2008-09 financial crisis. We consider alternative risk management 
strategies and propose some policy recommendations.  
 
In Figure 3, VaR forecasts are compared with S&P500 returns, where the vertical axis 
represents returns, and the horizontal axis represents the days from 2 January 2008 to 12 
February 2009. The S&P500 returns are given as the upper blue line that fluctuates 
around zero. 
  
ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only one of the available risk models. In this 
paper we propose a risk management strategy that consists in choosing from among 
different combinations of alternative risk models to forecast VaR. We first discuss a 
combination of models that can be characterized as an aggressive strategy and another 
that can be regarded as a conservative strategy, as given in Figure 3.  
 
The upper red line represents the infinum of the VaR calculated for the individual 
models of volatility, which reflects an aggressive risk management strategy, whereas the 
lower green line represents the supremum of the VaR calculated for the individual 
models of volatility, which reflects a conservative risk management strategy. These two 
lines correspond to a combination of alternative risk models. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, VaR forecasts obtained from the different models of 
volatility have fluctuated, as expected, during the first few months of 2008. It has been 
relatively low, at below 5%, and relatively stable between April and August 2008.  
Around September 2008, VaR started increasing until it peaked in October 2008, 
between 10% and 15%, depending on the model of volatility considered. This is 
essentially a four-fold increase in VaR in a matter of one and a half months.  In the last 
two months of 2008, VaR decreased to values between 5% and 8%, which is still twice 
as large as it had been just a few months earlier. Therefore, volatility has increased 
substantially during the financial crisis, and has remained relatively high after the crisis.  
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Figure 4 includes daily capital charges based on VaR forecasts and the mean VAR for 
the previous 60 days, which are the two lower smooth lines. The red line corresponds to 
the aggressive risk management strategy based on the infinum of the daily capital 
charges of the alternative models of volatility, and the green line corresponds to the 
conservative risk management strategy based on the supremum of the daily capital 
charges of the alternative models of volatility.  
 
Before the financial crisis, there is a substantial difference between the two lines 
corresponding to the aggressive and conservative risk management strategies. However 
at the onset of the crisis, the two lines virtually coincide, which suggests that the 
moving average term in the Basel II formula, which dominates the calculation of daily 
capital charges, is excessive. This suggests that the use of a shorter moving average in 
the Basel II formula for calculating the DCC may lead to a closer vertical alignment 
between the troughs of the VaR and DCC lines, thereby leading to a closer 
correspondence between high values of VaR and high values of DCC, as may be 
desirable.  
 
After the crisis had begun, there is a substantial difference between the two strategies, 
arising from divergence across the alternative models of volatility, and hence between 
the aggressive and conservative risk management strategies. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
It can be observed from Figure 4 that daily capital charges always exceed VaR (in 
absolute terms). Moreover, immediately after the financial crisis had started, a 
significant amount of capital was set aside to cover likely financial losses. This is a 
positive feature of the Basel II Accord, since it can have the effect of shielding ADIs 
from possible significant financial losses.  
 
The Basel II Accord would seem to have succeeded in covering the losses of ADIs 
before, during and after the financial crisis. Therefore, it is likely to be useful when 
extended to countries to which it does not currently apply.  
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[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 5 shows the accumulated number of violations for each model of volatility over 
the  period of 260 days considered (2 January 2008 to 12 February 2009). Table 3 gives 
the percentage of days for which daily capital charges are minimized, the mean daily 
capital charges, and the number of violations for the alternative models of volatility. 
The upper red line in Figure 5 corresponds to the aggressive risk management strategy, 
which yields 16 violations, thereby exceeding the recommended limit of 10 in 250 
working days. The lower green line corresponds to the conservative risk management 
strategy, which gives only 3 violations. Although this small number of violations is well 
within the Basel II limits, it may, in fact, be too few as it is likely to lead to considerably 
higher daily capital charges.  
 
It may be useful to consider other strategies that lie somewhat in the middle of the 
previous two, such as the median or the average value of the VaR forecasts for a given 
day. Another possibility could be the DYLES strategy, developed in McAleer et al. 
(2009), which seems to work well in practice. 
 
It is also worth noting from Table 3 and Figure 6, which gives the duration of the 
minimum daily capital charges for the alternative models of volatility, that four models 
of risk, including the conservative risk management strategy, do not minimize daily 
capital charges for even one day. On the other hand, the aggressive risk management 
strategy minimizes the mean daily capital charge over the year relative to its 
competitors, and also has the highest frequency of minimizing daily capital charges. 
The EGARCH model with t distribution errors also minimizes daily capital charges 
frequently, and has a low mean daily capital charge. However, it is interesting that the 
EGARCH model with normal errors has a mean daily capital charge that is almost as 
low as that of the aggressive risk management strategy, even though it rarely minimizes 
daily capital charges. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
In terms of choosing the appropriate risk model for minimizing DCC, the simulations 
results reported here would suggest the following:  
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(1) Before the financial crisis, the best models for minimizing daily capital charges are 
GARCH and GJR.  
(2) During the financial crisis, the best model is Riskmetrics.  
(3) After the financial crisis, the best model is TEGARCH. 
 
The financial crisis has affected risk management strategies by changing the optimal 
model for minimizing daily capital charges.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Under the Basel II Accord, ADIs have to communicate their risk estimates to the 
monetary authorities, and use a variety of VaR models to estimate risks. ADIs are 
subject to a back-test that compares the daily VaR to the subsequent realized returns, 
and ADIs that fail the back-test can be subject to the imposition of standard models that 
can lead to higher daily capital costs. Additionally, the Basel II Accord stipulates that 
the daily capital charge that the bank must carry as protection against market risk must 
be set at the higher of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 
business days, multiplied by a factor 3+k. An ADI’s objective is to maximize profits, so 
they wish to minimize their capital charges while restricting the number of violations in 
a given year below the maximum of 10 allowed by the Basel II Accord.  
 
In this paper we defined risk management in terms of choosing sensibly from a variety 
of conditional volatility (or risk) models, discussed the selection of optimal risk models, 
considered combining alternative risk models, choosing between a conservative and 
aggressive risk management strategy and evaluating the effects of the Basel II Accord 
on risk management. We also examined how risk management strategies performed 
during the 2008-09 financial crisis, evaluated how the financial crisis affected risk 
management practices, forecasted VaR and daily capital charges, and discussed 
alternative policy recommendations, especially in light of the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
These issues were illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, with an emphasis on 
how risk management practices were monitored and encouraged by the Basel II Accord 
regulations during the financial crisis.  
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Volatility has increased four-fold during the 2008-09 financial crisis, and remained 
relatively high after the crisis. This may be a reason why the financial crisis has changed 
the choice of risk management model for optimizing daily capital charges. Alternative 
risk models were found to be optimal before and during the financial crisis.  
 
In this paper we proposed the idea of constructing risk management strategies that used 
combinations of several models for forecasting VaR. It was found that an aggressive 
risk management strategy yielded the lowest mean capital charges, and had the highest 
frequency of minimizing daily capital charges throughout the forecasting period, but 
which also tended to violate too often. Such excessive violations can have the effect of 
leading to unwanted publicity, and temporary or permanent suspension from trading as 
an ADI. On the other hand, a conservative risk management strategy would have far 
fewer violations, and a correspondingly higher mean daily capital charge. 
 
The area between the bounds provided by the aggressive and conservative risk 
management strategies would seem to be a fertile area for future research.  
 
A risk management strategy that used different combinations of alternative risk models 
for predicting VaR and minimizing daily capital charges was found to be optimal. A 
risk model that leads to the median forecast of VaR may also be a useful risk 
management strategy, as would be the DYLES strategy established in McAleer et al. 
(2009).  
 
The Basel II Accord rules have been successful in covering the losses of ADIs before, 
during and after the 2008-09 financial crisis. Their application could be recommended 
for as yet unregulated markets and countries. Another recommendation would be to 
modify the Basel II Accord for calculating daily capital charges to shorten the moving 
average, to (say) 20 days, from the current 60 previous working days. This would allow 
a speedier adjustment of daily capital charges to changes in VaR, thereby avoiding the 
excessive lags observed in the simulations reported in the paper.  
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Table 1: Basel Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. 
The penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for 
the number of violations and not their magnitude, either 
individually or cumulatively.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for S&P500 Returns 
3 January 2000 – 12 February 2009 
 
0
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400
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1,000
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Series: S&P 500 returns (%)
Sample 3/01/2000 12/02/2009
Observations 2378
Mean      -0.023350
Median   0.000177
Maximum  10.95792
Minimum -9.469733
Std. Dev.   1.352380
Skewness  -0.158294
Kurtosis   11.92801
Jarque-Bera  7907.807
Probability  0.000000
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Table 3. Percentage of Days Minimizing Daily Capital Charges, Mean Daily 
Capital Charges, and Number of Violations for Alternative Models of Volatility 
 
Model % of Days 
Minimizing Daily 
Capital Charges 
Mean Daily 
Capital Charges 
Number of 
Violations 
Riskmetrics 14.0 % 0.163 10 
GARCH 0.0 % 0.161 13 
GJR 10.0 % 0.157 7 
EGARCH 1.70 % 0.146 13 
GARCH_t 0.00 % 0.171 3 
GJR_t 0.00 % 0.167 3 
EGARCH_t 34.0 % 0.153 3 
Lower bound 0.00 % 0.177 3 
Upper bound 39.6 % 0.143 16 
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Figure 1. Daily Returns on the S&P500 Index, 
 3 January 2000 – 12 February 2009 
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Figure 2. Daily Volatility in S&P500 Returns  
3 January 2000 – 12 February 2009 
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Figure 3. VaR for S&P500 Returns 
2 January 2008 – 12 February 2009 
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Note: The upper blue line represents daily returns for the 
S&P500 index. The upper red line represents the infinum of the 
VaR forecasts for the different models described in Section 3. 
The lower green line corresponds to the supremum of the 
forecasts of the VaR for the same models. 
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Figure 4.  VaR and Mean VaR for the Previous 60 Days to Calculate  
Daily Capital Charges for S&P Returns 
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Figure 5. Number of Violations Accumulated Over 260 Days  
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Figure 6. Duration of Minimum Daily Capital Charges for  
Alternative Models of Volatility 
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